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In this paper, we employ techniques from artificial intelligence such as reinforcement learning and agent 
based modeling as building blocks of a computational model for an economy based on conventions. First we 
model the interaction among firms in the private sector. These firms behave in an information environment 
based on conventions, meaning that a firm is likely to behave as its neighbors if it observes that their actions 
lead to a good pay off. On the other hand, we propose the use of reinforcement learning as a computational 
model for the role of the government in the economy, as the agent that determines the fiscal policy, and whose 
objective is to maximize the growth of the economy. We present the implementation of a simulator of the 
proposed model based on SWARM, that employs the SARSA(λ) algorithm combined with a multilayer 
perceptron as the function approximation for the action value function. 
 






In the last decades there was a relative growth of the economic studies about individual 
learning. Rational Expectations literature changed the toolbox of economists and many 
macroeconomic and economic policy models changed as a consequence. New versions of 
IS-LM models based on rational expectations that showed Keynesian policy effects were 
generalized. Models of monetary policy now point out problems of dynamic inconsistency 
that are the direct outcome of the introduction of learning agents. Much of the economic 
literature about learning has been focused in the problem of explaining how individuals and 
organizations can learn in an environment that assumes that policies and government are 
given conditions. Usually the problem is to find the optimal policy for an economy in 
which individuals learn from government actions. Learning is understood as a Bayesian 
process of actualization of expectations that converges to the real model of the economy. 
These models do not specify the nature of the learning process beyond the problem of 
availability of information about the probable actions of the government. The agents act 
rationally in concordance with available information and a specific process of updating 
information. However, rational expectations models often have multiple equilibrium points, 
and there is not a consensus in the literature about how to explain why the economy reaches 
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economic growth, some economists consider that it has a coordinating role, and that it 
pushes the economy toward a more desirable equilibrium point. The later assumes that 
there is a great normative clarity about what is desirable for society and about what are the 
institutional capacities the government has to develop what it proposes as a target. The 
recognition of the existence of complementarities between government and private actions 
has permitted to broaden macroeconomic discussion about coordination failures of the 
economic system and the scope of economic policy and to reformulate the analysis of the 
government’s institutional ability to push economic growth with its fiscal policy. In fact the 
existence of an order of multiple equilibriums depends on the optimism of private agents, 
and can explain the possibility that the government action can complement private actions. 
Strategic complementarities are those in which the increase of the effort of other agents 
conduces causes an agent to increase its own. This relationship between both efforts is the 
base of multiple equilibriums and strategic complementarities can generate multipliers 
effects
1. All this depends on the degree to which government can agree with private 
interests, and its skills to act first and sustain its actions.  
 
In these models the effectiveness of a policy depends on the temporal ordering of the 
actions the government and the private sector follow. However there is no definitive 
theoretical argument that supports the idea that the government cannot learn to act first and 
to have a more effective fiscal policy that leads to better rates of long run economic 
growth
2. But to think about this possibility, understood as an emergence process
3, requires 
an approximation to some open theoretical questions and figuring out appropriate formal 
tools that allow us to show how the interaction of the government and the private sector can 
maximize economic growth. 
 
In this paper, we take a different path. We employ techniques from artificial intelligence 
such as reinforcement learning and agent based modeling as building blocks of a 
computational model for an economy that permits us to shed light into the problems 
mentioned above. First we use the agent based capabilities of SWARM
4 to model the 
interaction among firms in the private sector. These firms behave in an information 
environment based on conventions, meaning that a firm is likely to behave as its neighbors 
if it observes that their actions lead to a good pay off. On the other hand, we propose the 
use of reinforcement learning as a computational model for the role of the government in 
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maximize the growth of the economy.  
 
In the next section, we explain how the interaction of the government with the economy can 
be cast in the reinforcement learning formalism and explain the algorithms employed in our 
simulator. Next we show some initial results of the application of reinforcement learning to 
the maximization of economic growth by means of the fiscal policy of the government.  
 
2. Reinforcement Learning and a Government that learns  
According to reinforcement learning theory
5, the learning agent is immersed in an 
environment that is usually complex and uncertain. The agent is supposed to learn to reach 
a goal by means of a series of actions. The agent observes the state of the environment and 
chooses and executes an action. The action in turn, has consequences that modify the 
environment. The agent does not receive information regarding the intrinsic value of each 
of the actions it executes, but only partial information, in the form of a reward signal (or 
reinforcement signal). The objective of the learning process is to find an optimal policy that 
tells the agent how to select an action in a given state of the environment, in such a way that 
the total reward is maximized (which usually means that the agent reaches its goal at 
minimum cost). 
 
A fundamental issue in reinforcement learning algorithms is the balance between 
exploration and exploitation. If an agent can find an action that yields a high reward, it can 
decide to stick to that action in the future (exploitation). However, that action may be not 
optimal in the long run, so it may be better to try a different action on occasion 
(exploration). In economics, models based on reinforcement learning have been applied to 
microeconomic problems
6 but applications to macroeconomic situations are scarce. In the 
macroeconomic model that we propose, the learning activity of the government can be 
represented with the reinforcement learning paradigm. The objective of the government as 
a learning agent is to learn an optimal policy that maximizes economic growth. By means 
of its fiscal policy, the government modifies the economic environment, without knowing, 
                                                 
5 Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto. Reinforcement Learning. MIT Press, 1998. 
 
6 For a complete analysis of reinforcement learning theory in agent based models see Duffy, J. (2006). 
“Agent-based models and human-subject experiments”, and  Brenner, T. (2006). “Agent learning 
representation: Advice on modelling economic learning” in Testfasion L and Judd K. eds. Handbook of 
Computational Economics vol.2, Elsevier.  See too Borgers Tilman and Rajiv Sarin. Learning through 
reinforcement and replicator dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory, 77:1–14, 1997, Ed Hopkins. Learning, 
matching and aggregation. Games and Economic Behavior, 26:79–110, 1999.  Ido Erev and Alvin Roth. 
Predicting how people play games: reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique mixed strategy 
equilibria. American Economic Review, 88:848–881, 1998. Ido Erev, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Alvin Roth. 
The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement 
learning models. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39:111–128, 1999.  Nick Feltovich. 
Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private information games: an experimental study. Journal of 




 in principle, a model of the economy. The government needs to learn to identify actions 
that are optimal in the lung run, in the sense that they maximize the growth of a 
decentralized economy. 
 
For simplicity, we assume that the government interacts with the environment consisting of 
a set of firms, in a sequence of discrete steps t = 0, 1, 2, . .  At a given time t, the 
government receives a representation of the state of the environment  , where S is the 
set of all possible states of the environment. Based on  , the agent selects an action 
 where A( ) is the set of possible actions at state . By executing the action, the 
agent receives a reward  and in turn, modifies the environment that goes to a new state 
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A policy P is a mapping S ×A →[0, 1] that assigns a probability to each action 
of being executed when the state of the environment is  . The task of the 
reinforcement learning algorithm is to find a policy that maximizes the expected value of 
the return received by the agent. This return is defined as the discounted sum of the rewards 
received over the future: 
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where   ∈ γ  [0, 1] is the discount rate. 
 
The reinforcement learning algorithm with an on-policy strategy iterates to basic steps.4 In 
the first step, it computes an estimate of the action value function (initially, for an arbitrary 
policy): 
     
which gives the expected value of the return when action   is taken in state  . In the 
second step, the policy is improved by selecting the next action in a greedy fashion 
according to the current estimate of the function Q. To maintain exploration, an arbitrary 




In the SARSA(λ) algorithm4 (which we implement in our simulator), the return value of an 
state action pair is approximated as  ) ( 1 , 1 1 + + + + t t t t a s Q r λ , where   is the resulting state 
after executing action  at, and  is the current estimate of the action value function. The 
algorithm updates all state actions pairs in the following way: 
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3. An artificial economy 
 
We have written a simulator of an economy based on conventions where the government 
uses reinforcement learning to search for a good expenditure policy. The simulator was 
written using the Swarm library for agent based modeling. Figure 1 shows the general 




Firms live in a two dimensional world where the propagation of expectations occur. A firm 
looks for a more or less optimistic rule (which determines how much the firm invests) 
depending on the value of the utilization of capacity (set by MA model) and the increase or 
decrease of the national income. For example, if the national income decreases an the 
utilization of capacity is low, the firm looks for a more optimistic rule among its neighbors. 
These changes occur only if the utilization of capacity has remained unchanged for a 
number of periods, and the firm has reason to believe that the situation is permanent. We 
allow the rule of each firm to be changed with a small probability to a random value. This 
allows us to maintain diversity in the pool of firms. 
 
Each firms maintains sight deposits, time deposits, and debt. According to the interest rate 
determined by the bank, it computes the amount of interest due to the bank and pays the 
interests with the sight deposits or, if they are not enough, with money borrowed from the bank. In the later case, the firm sets a flag indicating that it has entered a Ponzi situation. 
Similarly, the firm determines how much to invest (according to the rule set previously) 
and uses the sight deposits and/or increases its debt. Any leftover cash is used to pay debt 
or put in time deposits. When its capital depreciates completely, the firm becomes a rentier.  
The multiplier accelerator (MA) model collects information from all the firms and rentiers 
and implements the dynamics of the economy, according to the equation: 
   
    
 
where Y, I,D and E denote national income, investment, depreciation and government 
expenditure respectively, s is the saving rate and t the tax rate. The model then compares 
the ratio between capital and national income with a set of thresholds and sets the variable 
of utilization of capacity accordingly. The bank determines the interest rate as a linear 
function of the change in the number of firms and rentiers and the change in the national 
income. It also eliminates firms and rentiers that become bankrupt. 
 
The learner uses the gradient descent version of the SARSA(λ) algorithm to learn a good 
policy for the determination of the government expenditure. The information given to the 
learner consist of: 
  • Past history of the national income. 
  • Past history of the total debt. 
  • Past history of the number of firms and rentiers, including bankrupts. 
The learner returns an action in the form of a percentage change in the expenditure in a 
given range and with a given resolution within that range. As mentioned previously, the 
SARSA(λ) algorithm searches for an optimal policy, by estimating the State-action value 
function Q, and selecting greedily the next action according to the current estimate of Q at 
the current state. Since the state space is continuous valued, it is necessary to use a function 
approximation technique. We use a multilayer perceptron with one hidden layer to model 
Q. Thus, if w is the vector of weights of the MLP, the basic update equation is: 
   
where 
   
and  e is the vector of eligibility traces computed as: 
 
   
The gradient   is computed using the back-propagation algorithm. The reward 
signal is designed to encourage an increase in the national income while maintaining the 
economy in good shape. This implies following rules that maintain debt capacity of 
government under control and that the firms don’t dead. We compute r as a linear function 
of the percentage change in the national income, the total debt, and the change in the 
number of firms. When the number of firms goes bellow a given threshold, the reward is a 
large negative number. 
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4. Simulation 
We present results of the use of our simulator with a small economy which initially has 100 
firms. In figure 2 we present the evolution of the first few steps of the simulation when 
learning has not occurred. We can observe in this graphics the cyclical nature of the 
economy, for example in the behavior of the national income. In figure 3 we show a 
snapshot of the world were the firms live and interact. Colors indicate the rule currently in 
use by the firm at that location. 
 
 This simulation implements a learner that uses as input information the past three values of 
the national income, debt, and number of firms in the world. We have used 8 neurons in the 
hidden layer of the multilayer perceptron and set  γ = 0.8, λ = 0.8 and a learning rate of 
0.0001. 
 
In figure 4 we show the behavior of the national income after a few thousand iterations. We 
can see that although the cyclic behavior of the economy continues and the government is 
not able to prevent sudden collapses of the economy, these collapses are less frequent and 
the peak value of the income has an increasing trend. 
 
    
5. Conclusions 
We have used reinforcement learning and agent based modeling as building blocks of a 
computational model for an economy based on conventions. We have pointed out some 
dimensions of the problem of modeling government learning in an economy in which 
entrepreneurs expectations determine the long run tendencies of economic growth: 
coordination of expectations with conventions define the limits of the economic growth, 
and these limits are related to the rules that the government uses to learn. Further research will include improvements in the convergence of the reinforcement learning algorithm, in 
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